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Where Do the World’s Poor Live? A New Update 
Andy Sumner 
 
Summary 
This paper revisits, with new data, the changes in the distribution of global poverty towards 
middle-income countries (MICs). In doing so it discusses an implied ‘poverty paradox’ – the 
fact that most of the world’s extreme poor no longer live in the world’s poorest countries.  
 
The paper outlines the distribution of global poverty as follows: half of the world’s poor live in 
India and China (mainly in India), a quarter of the world’s poor live in other MICs (primarily 
populous lower MICs such as Pakistan, Nigeria and Indonesia) and a quarter of the world’s 
poor live in the remaining 35 low-income countries. Underlying this pattern is a slightly more 
surprising one: only 7 per cent of world poverty remains in low-income, stable countries.  
 
The paper discusses factors that are behind the shift in global poverty towards middle-
income countries in particular and how sensitive the distribution of global poverty is to the 
thresholds for middle-income classification. The paper concludes with implications for 
research related to poverty. 
 
Keywords: poverty; inequality; distribution; low-income countries; middle-income countries. 
 
Andy Sumner is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University 
of Sussex. 
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Introduction 
 
The majority of the world’s poor, by income and multi-dimensional poverty measures, live in 
countries classified by the World Bank as middle-income countries (Alkire et al. 2011; 
Chandy and Gertz 2011; Glassman et al. 2011; Kanbur and Sumner 2011a, 2011b; Koch 
2011; Sumner 2010, 2012). Such patterns matter beyond the thresholds of low-income 
countries and middle-income countries (LICs/MICs) set by the World Bank, because they 
reflect a pattern of rising average incomes. Further, although the thresholds do not mean a 
sudden change in countries when a line is crossed in per capita income, substantially higher 
levels of average per capita income imply substantially more domestic resources available 
for poverty reduction, and the international system treats countries differently at higher levels 
of average per capita income.1  
 
This paper updates the data for the distribution of global poverty to 2008 in light of the 
updated World Bank PovcalNet (2012) dataset and new global poverty estimates of Chen 
and Ravallion (2012). The paper also discusses factors behind the shift in global poverty 
towards middle-income countries and how sensitive the distribution of global poverty is to the 
thresholds for middle-income classification.2 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 updates the data on the changing distribution of 
global poverty, 1990 vs. 2008. Section 2 discusses the factors underlying the changes in the 
distribution of global poverty and Section 3, the thresholds for low and middle-income 
countries. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
1 The changing distribution of global 
poverty 
 
This section updates the global poverty distribution data originally published in Sumner 
(2010), and refined in Sumner (2012a), based on a significantly updated dataset (PovcalNet 
2012); and extends analysis to the $2 poverty line which is the average (median) poverty line 
for all developing countries (Chen and Ravallion, 2008). The data produced is consistent with 
the new global and regional estimates of Chen and Ravallion (2012).  
 
It is worth noting at the outset that the author is aware that there are a range of 
methodological questions about the use of poverty lines per se, and the international poverty 
lines in particular. These matters are discussed in Appendix. In terms of robustness by data 
coverage and corroboration: the new PovcalNet (2012) 2008 data covers 84 per cent of the 
population of LICs and 98 per cent of the population of MICs (see Appendix, Table A2);3 and 
the estimates for the distribution of global poverty by income poverty are consistent with the 
global distribution of multi-dimensional poverty (Alkire et al. 2011), health-related poverty 
data (Glassman et al. 2011) and malnutrition (Sumner 2010). 
 
                                                        
1 At a policy level such changes matter because the thresholds are used in various ways by a number of bilateral and 
multilateral donors in decision-making, often with other indicators to determine the terms of engagement with countries, as well 
as by various non-aid actors (such as investment ratings agencies). For a detailed discussion of how the thresholds are used by 
UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, WFP and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, see UNICEF (2009: 76–80). 
2 Special thanks to Pui Yan Wong and Henrique Conca Bussacos for research assistance. Thanks to Xavier Cirera, Ben Leo, 
Jeni Klugman, David Steven and Amy Pollard for feedback on earlier drafts. Correspondence to: a.sumner@ids.ac.uk 
3 Most notably are: Afghanistan (29m population in 2008), Korea (23m population), Myanmar (49m population) and Uzbekistan 
(27m population). Argentina (total population 39m) is not included as it has only urban poverty data in PovCal (2012) 
(presumably due to its high urbanisation rate). 
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New estimates for global poverty in 2008, based on the significantly updated PovcalNet 
(2012) dataset, support earlier findings that most of the world’s poor (by both $1.25 and $2 
international poverty lines) live in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, in 1990 
half of the world’s poor lived in East Asia and the Pacific, mostly in China (see Chen and 
Ravallion 2008, 2012).  
 
The proportion of the world’s $1.25 poor in China fell to an estimated 14 per cent in 2008, 
while India’s proportion of world poverty rose to 35 per cent, and sub-Saharan Africa’s to 31 
per cent (see Table 1.1 and 2.2). The $2 estimates – as noted, the average poverty line for 
developing countries – tell a similar story to the $1.25 estimates, with a notably lower 
contribution to world poverty from sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Estimates for 2008 also confirm that the world’s poor (by both $1.25 and $2 poverty lines) 
largely live in middle-income countries (MICs). The proportion of the world’s $1.25 and $2 
poor accounted for by MICs is respectively 74 per cent and 79 per cent. This suggests that 
using the average poverty line for developing countries means that even more of the world’s 
poor live in MICs.4  
 
In spite of the global distribution of poverty, it is important of course to note that LICs typically 
have higher rates of poverty incidence (see Table 1.1) and a larger poverty gap (see Sumner 
2012b). Thus any discussion of poverty in MICs should not distract from poverty in LICs.  
 
That said, some MICs do have surprisingly high poverty headcounts (and a higher than 
expected poverty gap) even at the higher average level of per capita income found in MICs. 
Across all MICs, the average (population weighted) incidence of poverty is almost one in five 
of the population at $1.25/day, and 40 per cent at $2/day. In the lower middle-income 
countries (LMICs), this rises to 30 per cent and 60 per cent respectively.5  
 
Importantly, the shift from the $1.25 poverty line to the $2 poverty line doubles the poor in 
MICs from almost 1bn to almost 2bn (meaning there are a billion people under $1.25 in MICs 
and another billion between $1.25 and $2 in MICs). In contrast, the shift from $1.25 to $2 in 
LICs raises thet total number of people in poverty less so (from 320m to 490m).  
 
In sum, the distribution of global poverty is thus:  
 
 Half of the world’s poor live in India and China (mainly in India); 
 A quarter of the world’s poor live in other MICs (primarily populous LMICs such as 
Pakistan, Nigeria and Indonesia); 
 A quarter (or less) of the world’s poor live in the remaining 35 LICs.  
 
Underlying this pattern is a slightly more surprising one when one considers ‘fragile states’. 
In short, the world’s poor are increasingly concentrated in fragile LICs (18.4 per cent of world 
poverty) and stable MICs (60.4 per cent of world poverty). Only 7 per cent of world poverty 
(90m poor people) is found in ‘traditional’ developing countries – meaning low-income and 
stable (e.g. Tanzania) (see Table 1.2). 
 
                                                        
4 There are about 920m extreme ($1.25/day) poor people in MICs or a ‘new bottom billion’ as referred to in Sumner (2012a). 
This is ‘new’ in the sense it is not the ‘bottom billion’ originally discussed by Collier (2007), which was identified as the total 
population of 58 countries that were ‘falling behind and often falling apart’ (Collier 2007: 3). This was based on data from the 
late 1990s and the turn of the century. Incidentally, the total population of the new expanded OECD (2011) ‘unofficial’ list of 
fragile states is a little over one billion people of which 400m are extreme ($1.25) poor and 650m are moderate ($2). 
5 For comparison, the LMIC group without India has poverty incidences of 25 per cent and 50 per cent at $1.25 and $2 
respectively. 
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Table 1.1 Estimates of the distribution of global poverty, and poverty incidence, $1.25 
and $2, 2008 
 
 $1.25 poverty line $2 poverty line 
 Millions of 
people 
% 
world’s 
poor 
Poverty 
incidence 
(% pop.) 
Millions of 
people 
% 
world’s 
poor 
Poverty 
incidence 
(% pop.) 
East Asia and Pacific 265.4 21.5 14.3 614.3 26.1 33.2 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 2.1  
0.2 
 
0.5 
 
9.9 
 
0.4 
 
2.4 
 
Latin American and the Caribbean 35.3  
2.9 
 
6.9 67.4 
 
2.9 
 
13.1 
Middle East and North Africa 8.5  
0.7 
 
2.7 
 
43.8 
 
1.9 
 
13.9 
South Asia 546.5 44.3 36.0 1,074.7 45.6 70.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 376.0 30.5 47.5 547.5 23.2 69.2 
       
Low-income countries 316.7 25.7 48.5 486.3 20.6 74.4 
Middle-income countries 917.1 74.3 19.5 1,871.1 79.4 39.7 
       
New MICs (post-2000) 651.7 52.8 33.4 1,266.4 53.7 64.9 
LMICs 711.6 57.7 30.2 1,394.5 59.2 59.1 
LMICs minus India 285.6 23.1 23.4 569.4 24.2 46.7 
UMICs 205.5 16.7 8.7 476.6 20.2 20.3 
China and India 599.0 48.6 24.3 1,219.5 51.7 53.8 
PINCIs 785.9 63.7 26.1 1,570.0 66.6 52.2 
45 fragile states (OECD 2011) 398.9 32.3 39.9 665.4 28.2 66.6 
Least developed countries 317.8 25.8 46.1 497.2 21.1 72.1 
       
Total 1,233.8 100.0 22.8 2,357.5 100.0 43.6 
Source: Data processed from PovcalNet (2012). Note: PINCIs = Pakistan, India, Nigeria, China and Indonesia. Fragile States = 
45 countries in OECD (2011). 
 
How many poor people live in ‘fragile states’ depends on the definition of ‘fragile states’ as 
well as the definition of poverty. The above estimates are based on the ‘non-official’ OECD 
(2011, p. 1) list of 45 fragile states which is based on the compilation of the ‘Harmonised List 
of Fragile Situations’ (2009; World Bank, African Development Bank and Asian Development 
Bank) and the 2009 Fund for Peace Failed States Index. The new PovcalNet (2012) data has 
high coverage of those 45 countries (see Appendix, Table A1). Of those 45 countries 26 are 
low-income and 18 are (lower) middle-income countries (and one country is not classified). 
 
There are 400m poor ($1.25) people living in those 45 ‘fragile states’, who in total, account 
for just under a third of world poverty. 45 per cent of the poor in those fragile states are living 
in countries classified as middle income and 55 per cent in countries classified as low 
income. And 65 per cent are in sub-Saharan Africa. One issue that is evident is that, taking 
the OECD (2011) ‘non-official’ fragile states list, more than two-thirds of the poor in fragile 
states live in just five countries: Nigeria (100m poor) Bangladesh (76m poor), the DRC (55m 
poor), Pakistan (35m poor) and Kenya (15.7m poor). Similar patterns are even more 
pronounced if one uses the higher poverty measure of $2/day (see Table 1.3).  
 
Table 1.2 Distribution of world poverty by low and middle income and fragile states 
combinations, 2008 ($1.25) 
 
 LICs MICs Totals 
% world poverty (%) 
Fragile states  18.4 13.9 32.3 
Non-fragile states 7.3 60.4 67.7 
 25.7 74.3 100.0 
Poor (millions) 
Fragile states  226.8 172.1 398.9 
Non-Fragile states 89.9 745.0 834.9 
 316.7 917.1 1,233.8 
Source: Data processed from PovcalNet (2012). Note: fragile states = 45 countries in OECD (2011). 
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The number of poor in fragile states has risen partially due to the revision of countries in the 
OECD (2011) list; most notably, the inclusion of populous Bangladesh in the group, which 
has a high poverty incidence but which wasn’t in the 43 countries of the OECD (2010) 
‘Resource Flows to Fragile States’ list.6 This earlier list was the product of combining three 
available lists of ‘fragile states’ at that time (Carlton, Brookings and the World Bank’s) thus 
producing the broadest possible list of 43 fragile states at that time. As noted in Sumner 
(2010), only 17 of those 43 ‘fragile states’ were common across the lists, and the differences 
in the countries listed mean the proportion of the world’s poor in fragile states in 2007 ranged 
from 6 per cent to 25 per cent (see detailed critique of the ‘fragile states’ lists from Harttgen 
and Klasen 2010).  
 
The Carlton and Brookings lists of ‘fragile states’ have not been updated since 2007 and 
2008 respectively, and are less frequently cited.7 One further list that has come to 
prominence is the annually updated list of The Fund for Peace, called The Failed States 
Index. This list is always 60 countries which are divided into three groups of 20 countries, 
that are respectively classified as ‘critical’ (bottom 20), ‘in danger’ (bottom 21–40), and 
‘borderline’ (bottom 41–60).  
 
Chandy and Gertz (2011) estimated the proportion of the world’s poor in fragile states at 40 
per cent using this list.8 The new PovcalNet (2012) dataset concurs producing a figure of 38 
per cent. However, it is worth noting only 21 per cent of the world’s poor are in the ‘critical’ 
countries and 11 per cent are in the ‘in danger’ countries. Thus, the use of the 40-country 
group produces an estimate of global poverty in ‘fragile states’ similar to that of the OECD 
(2011) country list. 
 
 
Table 1.3 Distribution of poverty in OECD (2011) fragile states (group of 45 countries), 
2008 
 
 Millions of 
people ($1.25) 
% fragile states 
poor ($1.25) 
LICs 226.8 56.9 
LMICs 172.1 43.1 
Total in 45 fragile states 398.9 100.0 
Total in five countries (Nigeria, DRC, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Kenya)  281.2 70.5 
   
   
Europe and Central Asia 1.4 0.3 
Middle East and North Africa 4.6 1.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 263.0 65.9 
East Asia and Pacific 3.2 0.8 
South Asia 120.4 30.2 
Latin America and Caribbean 6.3 1.6 
Source: Data processed from PovcalNet (2012). Note: fragile states = 45 countries in OECD (2011). 
 
Foreign Policy magazine uses fixed category sizes, whereas the Fund for Peace base their category thresholds on absolute 
scores. Chandy and Gertz (2011) use the later.
                                                        
6 The following were added: Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Georgia, Lebanon, Malawi, Palestinian Adm. Areas, Sri Lanka and 
Uzbekistan and the following were removed: Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Rwanda, Tonga, West Bank and Gaza. 
See Appendix, Table A1 for full list of OECD (2011) fragile states. 
7 For Carlton and Brookings lists see respectively: www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/ffs_raniking.php and 
www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx. 
8 The new PovCal (2012) dataset produces the following data: 259m $1.25 poor in the ‘critical’ group, 119m $1.25 poor in the ‘in 
danger’ group, and 69m $1.25 poor in the ‘borderline’ group (totalling 378m without the ‘borderline’ group and 447m with the 
‘borderline group’). In short, 21 per cent of the world’s poor live in the 20 ‘critical’ countries, 11 per cent live ‘in danger’ and a 
further 6 per cent of the world’s poor are in ‘borderline’ countries (in sum, 38.4 per cent of the world’s poor in those 60 
countries). 
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2 Factors underlying the changes in the 
distribution of global poverty 
 
The changes in global poverty distribution are a result of several factors. First, almost 30 
countries became better off in average per capita terms (by exchange rate conversion), 
attaining ‘middle-income’ classification, and thus the number of LICs fell from 63 in 2000 to 
35 in 2010 (see Table 2.1). This could fall to just 16 LICs in 2030 if one applies IMF World 
Economic Outlook (2012) projections up to 2030 (see Sumner 2012b). Second, the world’s 
poor are surprisingly concentrated: not only do 80 per cent of the world’s extreme 
($1.25/day) poor live in just ten countries, which accounts for 980m (another ‘bottom billion’) 
of the world’s poor, but almost 90 per cent of the world’s extreme poor live in just 20 
countries (see Table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.1 Number of LICs and MICs (GNI US$ per capita, Atlas) 
 
World Bank Fiscal Year (data from 
calendar year) 
FY02  
(2000) 
FY05 
(2003) 
FY10 
(2008) 
FY11 
(2009) 
FY12 
(2010) 
LICs 63 61 43 40 35 
MICs 92 93 101 104 109 
Source: World Bank (2011a). 
 
Of these ‘top 20’ poor countries by numbers of poor people, only half of these countries are 
LICs and the remaining half are MICs, and almost all of these are MICs which have attained 
MIC status in the past decade.  
 
The 28 ‘new MICs’ (‘new’ in the sense of ‘graduating’ over the last decade) account for two-
thirds of the world’s poor when added to China, or half of the world’s poor without China. 
Most notably, there are five large MICs (Pakistan, India, Nigeria, China, and Indonesia – 
henceforth ‘PINCIs’) which account for a substantial proportion of the world’s poor, and 
indeed, most of the number who ‘moved’ from living in LICs to living in MICs (Kanbur and 
Sumner 2011; Glennie 2011). In short, many of those countries where the world’s poor are 
concentrated are countries that became better off in average per capita income terms and 
graduated to LMIC status over the past decade.  
 
In those countries becoming richer in average per capita terms and achieving MIC status, 
although the incidence of poverty (percentage of population poor) generally fell, the absolute 
numbers of poor people fell less than one might expect. The actual number of poor people 
($1.25/day) barely fell (or even rose) in India, Nigeria and Angola. In China, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Vietnam and Sudan, $1.25 poverty incidence did fall. However, when one 
considers $2 poverty, there are only substantial declines in the number of poor people in 
China and Vietnam, and to a lesser extent Indonesia.  
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Table 2.2 Top 20 poor countries (by number of $1.25/day poor people), 2008, country 
classifications and GDP per capita PPP (countries transitioning from LIC to MIC since 
1990 are highlighted) 
 
 
% World 
$1.25 Poor 
 
% World  
$2 Poor 
Country classification 
(based on data for calendar 
year) 
GDP pc/day (PPP, constant 
2005 $) 
 2008 2008 1990 2009 1990  2009  
1.   India 34.5 35.0 LIC LMIC 3.4 8.2 
2.   China 14.0 16.7 LIC UMIC 3.0 17.0 
3.   Nigeria 8.1 5.4 LIC LMIC 3.9 5.6 
4.   Bangladesh 6.0 5.3 LIC LIC 2.0 3.9 
5.   DRC 4.5 2.6 LIC LIC 1.7 0.8 
6.   Indonesia 4.2 5.2 LIC LMIC 5.5 10.1 
7.   Pakistan* 2.3 5.2 LIC LMIC 4.4 6.5 
8.   Tanzania 1.4 1.6 LIC LIC 2.4 3.4 
9.   Philippines 1.3 1.6 LMIC LMIC 7.0 9.2 
10.  Kenya 1.2 1.1 LIC LIC 3.9 3.9 
11. Vietnam 1.1 1.6 LIC LMIC 2.5 7.5 
12. Uganda 1.1 0.9 LIC LIC 1.5 3.1 
13. Madagascar 1.1 0.7 LIC LIC 2.8 2.4 
14. Mozambique 1.0 0.8 LIC LIC 1.1 2.2 
15. Ethiopia* 0.9 1.8 LIC LIC 1.5 2.4 
16. Brazil 0.8 0.9 UMIC UMIC 19.7 25.9 
17. Angola 0.8 0.5 LIC LMIC 9.0 14.8 
18. Malawi 0.8 0.6 LIC LIC 1.6 2.1 
19. Nepal 0.8 0.8 LIC LIC 1.9 2.9 
20. Sudan* 0.7 0.8 LIC LMIC 2.8 5.4 
       
Top 10 79.2 79.5     
Top 20 86.6 89.1     
New MICs (28) 52.8 53.7     
New MICs + China 66.8 70.4     
PINCIs 63.7 66.6     
Source: Data processed from PovcalNet (2012) and WDI (2011). Note: * = The poverty data listed in PovcalNet (2012) for these 
countries in 2008 appears lower than one might expect suggesting caution (see also discussion in Sumner 2012b) and for rates 
by national poverty lines see Gentilini and Sumner (2012). 
 
Clearly, there is much more to investigate here in terms of explanatory factors. There are 
also some data that one might question. The poverty rates listed in PovcalNet for three 
countries (Pakistan, Sudan and Ethiopia) in 2008 appears to be lower than one might expect 
compared to national poverty lines (see for discussion, Gentilini and Sumner 2012). One 
would want to look closely at population growth rates in the poorest expenditure groups, and 
what has happened in the channels whereby economic development could lead to poverty 
reduction (e.g. wage employment, real wages, self-employment and productivity in self-
employment, and the output elasticity of demand for labour). And in doing so reconnecting 
poverty analysis to broader processes of economic development (Harriss 2007). 
Interestingly, for those new MICs with two data points there are some drastic changes away 
from agriculture value added as a proportion of GDP. For example, the proportion of 
agriculture value added as a percent of GDP drastically fell in Ghana, India, Laos, Lesotho, 
Vietnam and Yemen (see Table 2.4 and discussion in Sumner 2012b). 
 
At a minimum, the fact that poverty persists at higher levels of average per capita income 
raises questions about the types of economic growth that lead some countries to reduce the 
number of people in extreme poverty and other countries not to. Most studies have argued 
that growth is good for the poor in the general sense that the income of the poor rises one-
for-one in line with average income (Dollar and Kraay 2002; Gallup et al. 1999; Roemer and 
Gugerty 1997), and the poverty headcount ratio declines significantly with growth (Bruno et 
al. 1998; Ravallion 1995, 2001; Ravallion and Chen 1997). While it has been strongly 
asserted that, on average, growth is matched by proportionate reductions in poverty, some 
evidence challenges this view; suggesting rather that the incomes of the poorest may 
increase less than proportionately with growth (Besley and Cord 2007; Grimm et al. 2007). 
Importantly, the averages hide large variations across countries and across measures of 
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poverty, both questioning the relevance of the global average and whether growth responds 
differently to different kinds of (chronic and transient) income poverty. Initial inequality has 
most commonly been identified as deterministic in the heterogeneity of country experience: a 
higher level of inequality leads to less poverty reduction at a given level of growth (Deininger 
and Squire 1998; Hanmer and Naschold 2001; Kraay 2004; Ravallion 1995, 1997, 2001, 
2004, 2007; Ravallion and Chen 1997; Son and Kakwani 2003; Stewart 2000). The 
heterogeneity of country experience has also been linked to changes in inequality over time, 
due to geographical differences (urban-rural); the sectoral pattern of growth; the composition 
of public expenditure; labour markets; social capital endowments and the variance in actual 
rates of growth (Fields 2001; Kraay 2004; Mosley 2004; Mosley et al. 2004; Ravallion 1995; 
Ravallion and Chen 1997).9  
 
Table 2.3 Poverty in the top 20 countries, 1990 vs. 2008 (countries transitioning from 
LIC to MIC since 1990 are shaded) 
 
 % population poor Poor people (millions) 
 $1.25 $2 $1.25 $2 
 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 
1.   India 51.3 37.4 82.6 72.4 435.9 426.0 701.7 825.1 
2.   China 60.2 13.1 84.6 29.8 683.2 173.0 960.6 394.3 
3.   Nigeria 60.4 66.5 80.1 84.0 58.8 100.5 77.9 127.0 
4.   Bangladesh 68.4 46.6 91.8 78.4 79.1 74.6 106.2 125.5 
5.   DRC 56.3 86.2 77.5 94.5 20.8 55.4 28.7 60.7 
6.   Indonesia 54.3 22.6 84.6 54.4 96.3 51.5 150.0 123.6 
7.   Pakistan * 61.9 21.0 87.0 60.2 66.9 34.9 93.9 99.9 
8.   Tanzania 69.8 66.8 90.2 87.3 17.8 28.4 23.0 37.1 
9.   Philippines 29.7 19.4 54.9 42.2 18.5 17.5 34.2 38.1 
10.  Kenya 36.2 40.6 57.0 64.5 8.5 15.7 13.4 25.0 
TOP 10     1,485.6 977.5 2,189.6 1,856.4 
11. Vietnam 73.1 16.9 90.1 43.3 48.4 14.5 59.6 37.4 
12. Uganda 68.7 44.4 86.5 70.6 12.2 14.1 15.3 22.3 
13. Madagascar 74.1 71.6 88.8 89.3 8.3 13.7 10.0 17.1 
14. Mozambique 81.3 59.6 92.9 81.8 11.0 13.3 12.6 18.3 
15. Ethiopia * 62.1 16.0 85.3 53.6 30.0 12.9 41.2 43.2 
16. Brazil 17.2 6.0 30.0 11.3 25.8 11.5 44.9 21.7 
17. Angola 46.7 55.9 62.9 71.6 5.0 10.1 6.7 12.9 
18. Malawi 89.0 67.3 96.0 87.5 8.4 10.0 9.1 13.0 
19. Nepal 74.5 33.9 92.0 64.9 14.2 9.8 17.6 18.7 
20. Sudan * 56.2 20.4 82.1 45.0 15.2 8.4 22.2 18.6 
TOP 20     1,664.2 1,095.8 2,428.8 2,079.6 
Source: Data processed from PovcalNet (2012). Note: * = The poverty data listed in PovcalNet (2012) for these countries in 
2008 appears lower than one might expect suggesting caution (see also discussion in Sumner 2012b) and for rates by national 
poverty lines see Gentilini and Sumner (2012). 
 
Table 2.4 Selected ‘new MICs’ and structural change of GDP 
 
 Agriculture, value added, % GDP 
 1990 2009 
Ghana 45.1 31.8 
India 29.3 17.8 
Indonesia 19.4 15.3 
Lao PDR 61.2 35.2 
Lesotho 24.9 7.7 
Mauritania 29.6 20.2 
Pakistan 26.0 21.6 
Senegal 19.9 17.2 
Vietnam 38.7 20.9 
Yemen, Rep. 24.4 9.9 
Source: WDI (2011). 
                                                        
9 Increases in agricultural productivity have been thought to be the most effective for the reduction of poverty (Bourguignon and 
Morrisson 1998; Gallup et al. 1999; Timmer 1997; Thirtle et al. 2001). Similarly, labour intensive growth is more poverty 
reducing because the poor’s main asset is labour. Adelman (2000) has argued that the factor intensity of growth determines the 
distribution of benefits. 
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3 The thresholds for low and middle-
income countries 
 
The shift in global poverty raises various questions about the thresholds themselves, and 
whether any thresholds solely or largely based on defining poverty by ‘poor’ countries rather 
than ‘poor’ people are useful any longer, given the declining number of low-income countries.  
 
The LIC/MIC thresholds are based on GNI per capita average income (exchange rate 
conversion).10 One could argue that thresholds set in the 1960s are worthy of a substantial 
review, particularly because (i) the methodology for original threshold setting has never been 
published;11 (ii) some 40–50 years of new data are available since the thresholds were 
originally established; (iii) there are questions over whether ‘international inflation’ ought now 
to include China and other ‘emerging economies’ in its calculation, and indeed whether the 
use of ‘international inflation’ rates for the world’s richest countries is an appropriate way to 
assess the LIC/MIC thresholds over time for the world’s poorer countries, which may have 
had inflation rates above the ‘international inflation’ rate.  
 
More fundamentally, one could also ask: should such thresholds simply be abandoned 
outright or a more sophisticated approach considered? Alternatively, such thresholds could 
instead be applied at a different level, for example, sub-national level (so poorer states in 
India would qualify; see later discussion on sub-national income per capita). 
 
With regards to assessing if the changing global distribution of poverty is an artefact of 
methodology (meaning a sleight of hand), there are several issues. First, are the thresholds a 
meaningful way of dividing the world into four groups of countries, in relative terms at least? 
Interestingly, and coincidentally, the current thresholds for LIC, LMIC, UMIC and HIC are 
somewhat similar to the quartile boundaries if one splits the world’s countries with the 
necessary data into four equal groups. For example, the current classification, the threshold 
for LICs (<$1005 GNI per capita) is reasonably close to the threshold for the bottom quartile 
(<$1,180); the threshold for LMICs ($1006–$3,975) corresponds with quartile two ($1,181–
$3,850); and the threshold for UMICs ($3,976–$12,275) corresponds with quartile three 
($3,851–$10,120) (see Table 3.1). 
 
Analysis of the countries in each quartile (GNP pc Atlas and GDP PPP pc 2005 constant $) 
in 1990 and 2008/9 and the changing distribution of world poverty by quartiles produces 
interesting results (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). Of course, this is a relative comparison in 
contrast to an absolute comparison of country thresholds. What is evident is that the vast 
majority of countries are in exactly the same quartile by GNI pc Atlas and GDP PPP pc in 
                                                        
10 The World Bank’s thresholds are discussed in-depth in Sumner (2012a). See also Nielsen (2011). The World Bank’s ‘Atlas 
method’ takes GNI in national currency and converts it to US dollars using the three-year average of exchange rates (taking the 
average of a country’s exchange rate for that year and its exchange rates for the two preceding years), adjusted for the 
difference between national inflation and that of ‘international inflation’ (the weighted average of inflation in the Euro Zone, 
Japan, the UK, and the US as measured by the change in the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights deflator). 
11 According to the short history of the Bank’s classifications available on their website (World Bank 2011a), the actual basis for 
the original thresholds was established by: ‘finding a stable relationship between a summary measure of well-being such as 
poverty incidence and infant mortality on the one hand and economic variables including per capita GNI estimated based on the 
Bank's Atlas method on the other. Based on such a relationship and the annual availability of Bank's resources, the original per 
capita income thresholds were established.’ The actual documentation containing the original formulae are identifiable by their 
World Bank document numbers (contained in the Excel sheet on the World Bank’s classification history webpage noted above), 
but these are World Bank board documents and not publically available. The exact formulae of the thresholds have never been 
published. Indeed, the World Bank’s Public Information Centre notes in personal correspondence that: ‘there is no official 
document that we can find that ever specified an exact formula for setting the original income thresholds… When IDA was 
established in 1960, member countries were classified... based more on a general understanding and agreement by the 
executive directors of each country rather than strict income guidelines [emphasis added] – though, for the most part, the 
classifications were in line with per capita income levels’. [Personal correspondence]. 
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1990 and in 2008 with the exception of 17 countries which have risen quartile by GNI pc and 
16 countries that have risen quartile by GDP pc PPP. 
 
Table 3.1 Country thresholds and quartile data, 1990 and 2009 
 
 1990 2009 
 Thresholds 
(US$ pc, Atlas) 
Quartiles 
(US$ pc, Atlas) 
Thresholds 
(US$ pc, Atlas) 
Quartiles 
(US$ pc, Atlas) 
HIC or Q4 > 7,621+ 7330–75810 > 12,276 > $10,120 
UMIC or Q3 2,466–7,620 1740–7260 3,976–12,275 3,851–10,120 
LMIC or Q2 611–2,465 550–1720 1006–3975 1181–3850 
LIC or Q1 <=610 < 540 <=1005 < 1,180 
Source: Data processed from WDI (2011). 
 
Taking either the GNI pc by Atlas (as per the LIC/MIC estimation) or the GDP PPP per 
capita, in 1990 almost 90 per cent of the world’s poor lived in the poorest quartile of 
countries. Whilst, in 2008, only a third of the world’s poor were in the poorest quartile and 
two-thirds were in the quartile above (Q2) the poorest quartile.  
 
Four-fifths of the world’s poor in Q2 GDP PPP per capita in 2008 were accounted for by India 
and China. The remainder relate both to countries rising from Q1 to Q2: notably Pakistan and 
Vietnam and also Bhutan, Cape Verde and Guyana and populous countries already in Q2 
such as Indonesia. 
 
Table 3.2 GNI pc (Atlas) and GDP pc PPP (constant 2005 $): Relative position of 
countries by quartiles (countries by 1990 and 2008 position, Q1 = poorest) 
 
GNI pc 
Atlas  
 1990 
2008 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 (*) (**) 
Q4 35 6 0 1 
Q3 1 29 4 0 
Q2 (*) 0 2 28 6 
Q1 (**) (poorest) 0 0 5 30 
GDP pc 
PPP 
constant 
2005 $ 
 1990 
2008 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 (*) (**) 
Q4 40 3 1 0 
Q3 2 33 5 0 
Q2 (*) (**) 0 5 30 7 
Q1 (poorest) 0 0 3 35 
Source: Processed from WDI (2011). Note: * = China; ** = India. 
 
Table 3.3 Distribution of global poverty ($1.25 and $2) by GNI pc (Atlas) and GDP pc 
(PPP 2005 constant $) quartiles 
 
 $1.25 $2 
 1990 2008 1990 2008 
GNI pc (Atlas) 
Q4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Q3 2.4 2.4 3.2 3.1 
Q2 8.9 31.3 (*) 10.9 33.6 (*) 
Q1 (poorest) 88.7 (*) (**) 66.3 (**) 85.9 (*) (**) 63.4 (**) 
GDP pc PPP (constant 2005$) 
Q4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Q3 2.5 2.5 3.8 3.4 
Q2 8.9 60.6 (*) (**) 11.1 67.8 (*) (**) 
Q1 (poorest) 88.5 (*) (**) 36.8 85.1 (*) (**) 28.9 
Source: Processed from PovcalNet (2012) and WDI (2011). Note: * = China; ** = India. 
By GNI pc (Atlas) India is second from the top of Q1. However, by GDP PPP pc India is in Q2. 
 
Does the graduation of countries reflect higher per capita income in PPP terms or simply in 
exchange rate conversion? In general there is a close correlation between GNI per capita by 
Atlas and PPP (see Figure 3.1 and Table 3.4). Although all of the 28 New MICs are better off 
in terms of GNI per capita (exchange rate conversion) in 2009 compared to 1990 (or they 
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wouldn’t have crossed the LIC to MIC threshold), there are a very small number of countries 
(including Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia), who although having higher GNI per capita, 
by GDP PPP per capita terms they were barely better off, or in some cases worse off.12 
 
Figure 3.1 GNI pc (Atlas, Current $) vs. GDP pc PPP (2005, int’l $) 
 
 
Source: Data processed from WDI (2011). Note: Dark/Blue = LICs, Light/Green = LMICs 
 
 
Table 3.4 Correlation, GNI pc (Atlas) and GDP pc PPP, average value, 2008–10 
 
 GDPpcPPP2005intl$day GNIpcAtlasCurrent$ 
LICs and LMICs 
GDPpcPPP2005intl$day 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,899**
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000
N 84 83
GNIpcAtlasCurrent$ 
Pearson Correlation ,899** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 83 87
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). R2 linear =0.807; R2 quadratic =0.801 
LICs, LMICs and UMICs 
GDPpcPPP2005intl$day Pearson Correlation 1 ,955**
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000
N 135 134
GNIpcAtlasCurrent$ Pearson Correlation ,955** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 134 139
 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). R2 linear = 0.913; R2 quadratic = 0.913 
Source: Data processed from WDI (2011). 
 
There is the question of how sensitive the changes in the distribution of global poverty are to 
the LIC/MIC thresholds. The two figures (Figures 3.2 and 3.3) below respectively show the 
cumulative poverty counts by GNI per capita with LIC/LMIC/UMIC thresholds identified. 44 
per cent of the world’s poor live in India and Nigeria; countries that are about 20 per cent 
above the $1005 threshold. The shift in the global distribution of poverty from LICs to MICs is 
thus, of course, a function of the thresholds themselves; but the bulk of world poverty is well 
above the current $1005 per capita LIC threshold.  
 
                                                        
12 Further, some but not all of the ‘transition’ economies in the new MIC group, such as Georgia and Ukraine, are not better off 
in PPP per capita terms despite graduating by Atlas terms. However, for such countries, unreliable GNI per capita data for 1990 
may be an issue. 
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Such an assessment is, however, based on a methodological mismatch – the mismatch 
between the Atlas (exchange rate conversion) method used to construct the ‘poor countries’ 
threshold (meaning the LIC/MIC threshold), and the PPPs method used to construct the 
‘poor people’ threshold (meaning the international poverty lines). Thus to assess more 
systematically how sensitive estimates of global poverty are to thresholds, one approach that 
can be taken is to produce cumulative poverty counts for $1.25 poverty and plot against GDP 
PPP per capita at multiples of the $1.25 poverty line (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4). Indeed, one 
way one could think about absolute and relative ‘poor’ countries is by applying the 
international poverty line – $1.25/day (or $2/day) – for individuals, and multiples of them, to 
each country’s average income.13 This might mean that one could say there are: 
 
  ‘Absolute poor’ countries: VLICs (very low-income countries) with an average income 
of less than $1.25 per capita/day, and MLICs (moderately low-income countries) with 
an average income of less than $2.50 pc/day; 
 ‘Relatively poor’ countries: LMICs with an average income of less than $5 pc/day, and 
UMICs with an average income of less than $13 pc/day (which would be below the 
poverty line in the USA; see Ravallion 2009);  
 ‘Non-poor’ or high-income countries: countries with an average income of more than 
$13 pc/day (which would be above the poverty line in the USA).  
 
Such an approach is open to the criticism that it simply replaces one set of arbitrary 
thresholds with another set, albeit a set that logically links definitions of poverty. Alternatively, 
one might make more use of the classifications of low, (and medium, high and very high) 
Human Development Countries (see UNDP 2011). These are relative and based on the 
quartiles of HDI distribution across countries, meaning there will always be a quarter of all 
countries that are low HDI in any year. There is also the UN category of ‘Least Developed 
Countries’ used in Table 1.1 in this paper, which utilises a sophisticated methodology that 
combines human assets (including nutrition, child mortality, school enrolment and adult 
literacy), economic vulnerability (including measures of the instability of agricultural 
production, population displaced by natural disasters, instability in exports, the share of 
agriculture in GDP and exports), and proxies for economic ‘smallness’ (less than 75 million 
people), ‘remoteness’ and GNI per capita. However, the graduation criteria make it very 
difficult to leave the category (see Guillaumont 2010) and a third of the 49 LDCs are MICs. 
 
Are the current thresholds comparable with the thresholds in 1990? This is a difficult question 
to answer. Whether ‘international inflation’ is a meaningful way to update the thresholds is 
open to discussion. To assess the comparability fully one would want to assess PPPs, 
although this too is contentious (see Deaton 2010, 2011; Deaton and Heston 2010). One 
way of looking at the issue is to compare, over time, changes by country group averages. If 
one considers various GNI and GDP per capita measures, (see Table 3.5), one finds that 
that the ‘average’ for the LIC and MIC country groups are approximately the same as in 1990 
by average GDP pc/day PPP (constant 2005 international $). This comparison is interesting 
as the countries in each grouping have changed substantially, and yet the group average is 
(reasonably) comparable (and the degree of dispersion within country groups is not high). 
 
An alternative is to make a relative assessment – relative to world average GNI per capita 
(see Table 3.6 below) in order to compare the LIC/MIC thresholds to world per capita GNI. 
Nielsen (2011: 13) notes, ‘the low-income threshold fell from 16 to 11 percent of average 
world income over this period [1976–2009] and the high-income threshold fell from 189 to 
140 percent’. 
                                                        
13 $1.25/day is the mean of the national poverty lines of the poorest 15 countries in terms of 
consumption per capita, and thus there is clear logic that one should judge extreme poverty by the 
poverty lines in the poorest countries, rather than $2/day which is the median poverty line for all 
developing countries (Chen and Ravallion 2008: 4). 
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One can consider other indicators but it is not clear how to interpret these, as the LIC group 
average reflects those countries ‘left behind’. For example, comparing 1990 and 2009, the 
average for the LIC group saw little change in forex reserves but significant increases in aid 
dependency, primary export concentration and weaker domestic savings; all of which likely 
reflects the LICs ‘left behind’ being structurally poorer LICs than those which saw average 
incomes rise over the period. Conversely, the LMIC group average was significantly better off 
by forex, and had lower aid dependency and lower primary export concentration. However, 
within each country grouping, although the variation by per capita income is low, the degree 
of dispersion within country groups for indicators of aid dependency and export indicators 
would suggest caution in interpretation of the country group averages for these indicators 
(see for discussion, Sumner 2012b).  
 
Table 3.5 Estimates of Average GDP pc/day PPP, constant 2005 intl $, pop. 
unweighted, 1990 vs. 2009 
 
 1990 2009 
LICs 3.2  2.8  
MICs 17.1  17.7  
Source: Processed from WDI (2011).  
 
Table 3.6 LIC threshold as a percent of world per capita GNI 
 
 FY1978 FY1984 FY1989 FY2011 
Threshold as % world 
GNI per capita 
17 16 15 11 
Source: Adapted from Nielsen (2011: 12). 
 
One further issue is spatial and group inequalities within MICs, and whether the world’s poor 
live in low-income provinces or specific social groups in MICs or ‘LICs within MICs’ (and/or 
certain social groups within MICs) or conflict-affected states within MICs. One could test the 
hypothesis that many MICs, especially lower MICs, are in fact collections of LIC-like 
provinces with a small number of higher per capita income MIC-like provinces. To pursue this 
is, of course, a much bigger endeavour. However, if one considers India, one finds support 
for this hypothesis. If one applied the LIC-MIC threshold at sub-national level, a substantial 
number of states in India would likely be LICs and an estimated two-thirds of India’s poor 
would live in those LIC states and perhaps surprisingly, a third of India’s poor would live in 
MIC states in India (see Table 3.7).14  
 
Further, almost half – 46 per cent - of India’s poor live in states with significant Naxal-related 
conflict (proxied by deaths data). One could extend this analysis to look at if the world’s poor 
live in conflict-affected and/or poorly governed states in middle-income countries such as 
Nigeria and Pakistan for example as argued by Evans and Steven (2012). However, one 
might also say 60% of Naxalite-related conflict deaths are in just two states (one low income 
and one middle income - respectively, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh) and those two states 
only account for 7% of poverty in India. And as the government of India (GoI, 2012: 2) notes, 
rural dwelling Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Castes face, 
respectively, poverty rates of 47.4 per cent, 42.3 per cent and 31.9 per cent, compared to 
33.8 per cent for all classes. In contrast, urban dwelling Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes 
and Other Backward Castes face respectively poverty rates of 34.1 per cent, 30.4 per cent 
and 24.3 per cent, compared to 20.9 per cent for all classes. 
                                                        
14 The new poverty line in India utilised in 2009–10 data, ‘happens to be close to, but less than, the 2005 PPP $1.25 per day 
poverty norm used by the World Bank in its latest world poverty estimates’ (Government of India 2009: 8), and produces a 
national poverty rate of 29.8 per cent or 355m poor (compared to the $1.25 data that produces a rate of 32.7 per cent or 426m 
poor according to PovCal (2012) and population data in WDI (2011).  
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Table 3.7 Estimates of the distribution of poverty by national poverty line in India by 
state, 2009/10 
 
  Est. GNI pc 
by state, 
2009 (US$) 
State GNI 
pc, 2009 as 
% India 
average 
($1220) 
% 
Population 
poor in each 
state 
(2009/10) 
% of total 
Indian poor 
by state 
% of total 
number of 
deaths in 
India due to 
Naxal-
related 
conflict, 
2007-2011 
Bihar 415 34 53.5 15.3 9.4 
Manipur 587 48.1 47.1 0.4  - 
Madhya Pradesh 609 49.9 36.7 7.4 0.1 
Uttar Pradesh 646 53 37.7 20.8 0.2 
Jharkhand 691 56.6 39.1 3.6 23.1 
Assam 751 61.6 37.9 3.3 - 
Jammu and Kashmir 753 61.7 9.4 0.3 - 
Nagaland 780 63.9 20.9 0.1 - 
Tripura 821 67.3 17.4 0.2 - 
Mizoram 845 69.3 21.1 0.1 - 
Rajasthan 853 69.9 24.8 4.7 - 
Orissa 881 72.2 37.0 4.3 8.0 
Arunachal Pradesh 922 75.6 25.9 0.1 - 
Meghalaya 925 75.8 17.1 0.1 - 
West Bengal 990 81.2 26.7 6.8 12.4 
% of Indian’s poor in LIC states       67.4   
Tamil Nadu 1,039 85.2 17.1 3.4 - 
Sikkim 1,078 88.4 13.1 0 - 
Chhattisgarh 1,147 94 48.7 3.4 36.7 
Uttaranchal  1,236 101.3 18 0.5 -  
Andhra Pradesh 1,253 102.7 21.1 5.0 3.6 
Karnataka 1,304 106.9 23.6 4.0 - 
Kerala 1,365 111.9 12 1.1 - 
Himachal Pradesh 1,541 126.3 9.5 0.2 - 
Gujarat 1,684 138 23 3.8 - 
Punjab 1,739 142.5 15.9 1.2 - 
Maharashtra 1,933 158.4 24.5 7.6 6.1 
Haryana 2,171 178 20.1 1.4 - 
Delhi 2,399 196.6 14.2 0.7 - 
Goa 3,019 247.4 8.7 0.0 - 
% of India’s poor in MIC states       32.5   
Total       99.9 99.7 
Sources: GNI pc by state from www.ceicdata.com based on relative GDP PPP pc: (Province GDP pc / National GDP 
pc)*(National GNI per capita). Poverty data based on GoI (2012). Deaths from Naxal-related conflict from Ministry of Home 
Affairs data: http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/nm_pdf1.pdf 
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4 Conclusions 
 
This paper has updated the data for the distribution of global poverty to 2008 with the most 
recently available data and explored the factors behind the shift in global poverty towards 
middle-income countries. It has also examined how sensitive the distribution of global 
poverty is to the thresholds for middle-income classification. 
 
The updated data and broader analysis substantiates the changing distribution of global 
poverty towards MICs (however defined) and suggests an apparent ‘poverty paradox’ – most 
of the world’s poor do not live in the world’s poorest countries.  
 
The changing distribution of global poverty challenges the orthodox view that most of the 
world’s extreme poor live in the world’s poorest countries, and that extreme poverty is 
minimal at higher levels of average per capita income. This shifts how we view global poverty 
because understandings and definitions of poverty have: (i) tended to underemphasise 
questions of national inequality, and (ii) tended to present poverty as ‘residual’ at higher 
levels of average per capita income rather than a structural outcome of specific patterns of 
growth and distribution, and their interaction with sub-national/spatial inequalities and 
horizontal/group inequalities.  
 
One take on the data is that extreme poverty is turning gradually from a question of poor 
people in absolute poor countries to poor people in relative poor countries or non-poor 
countries (depending on the definition applied for this). This implies a shift over time from 
international redistribution (via aid) to national redistribution of some kind; and thus a greater 
focus on governance and the relationship between the poor and the non-poor, as the latter, 
in the not-too-distant future, may have the capacity to end the poverty of the former. 
 
What the above points to is that poverty research needs to go beyond studying the ‘poor.’ 
This would suggest that, rather than study individual or household deprivations as poverty 
research has tended to do, much more focus should be placed on socioeconomic groups 
and inter- and intra- group distribution and social differentiation. This means less focus on 
studying the ‘poor’ and greater focus on studying the ‘non-poor’, meaning not only those 
groups vulnerable to poverty but the secure middle class and elites, and their social 
relationships with the ‘poor’. This would mean more focus on reconnecting poverty research 
with the broader processes of economic development, and implies a shift from researching 
the ‘traditional’ area of mainstream poverty research (meaning deprivation) to researching 
something different and far more political: distribution.  
 
Of course, many researchers have been doing this already, but some argue that poverty 
research in the mainstream has been depoliticised by the ‘measurement obsession’. 
Measurement is not the problem, however. The problem is embedding poverty research 
within an analysis that includes distribution, social differentiation and the process of 
economic development – in short, the political economy of poverty. Poverty research has 
underemphasised questions of inequality under the assumption that poor people always live 
in poor countries so inequality does not matter if everyone is poor. That is no longer so 
certain. Mainstream poverty research has also tended to present poverty as ‘residual’ at 
higher levels of average per capita income, rather than an outcome of specific patterns of 
economic development and social structures and relationships. Poverty in middle-income 
countries raises a question mark over this. In sum, in the future the questions for poverty 
research might be reframed from ‘Who is poor?’ and ‘Why are they poor?’ to ‘Who does 
what?’ and ‘Who gets what?’. 
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Appendix: Methodological appendix 
 
The pattern observed in the distribution of global poverty raises numerous methodological 
questions. First, there are the $1.25 and $2 poverty lines themselves have been subject to 
considerable contention (for critical review see Fischer 2010). Most notably, such contention 
has centred on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) related issues (see discussion in Sumner 
2012 drawn from Deaton 2010, 2011; Deaton and Heston 2010; Klasen 2010). However, in 
spite of various issues related to data quality (e.g. the treatment of urban and rural areas of 
large countries); prices for ‘comparison resistant items’ (e.g. government services, health and 
education); the effects of the regional structure of the latest International Comparison 
Programme; the absence of weights within basic headings which may result in basic 
headings being priced using high-priced, unrepresentative goods that are rarely consumed in 
some countries; the use of national accounts statistics data that does not reflect consumption 
patterns of people who are poor by global standards), Deaton (2010: 31) concludes that the 
reweighting of the PPPs matters less than might be thought and instead, the quality of 
underlying household surveys and national accounts is a more urgent area for improvement: 
 
PPPs for the poorer countries in Africa or in Asia may be good enough [emphasis 
added] to support global poverty counts, at least provided the uncertainties are 
recognized [emphasis added]. (Deaton 2010: 31). 
 
Further, clustering around the ‘international poverty line’ between $1 and $1.25 ‘Asianised’ 
world extreme poverty because 200m Indians live(d) between $1 to $1.25 in 2005 (Deaton 
2011). It is for this reason that it is important to make global estimates both with and without 
India and China) in tables, so comparisons can be made. 
 
This points towards the fact that people move in and out of poverty, and numerous studies 
have shown that there is no such group as ‘the poor’ in the way the term is conventionally 
used. Of particular relevance is the poverty dynamics literature, and the research on chronic 
and transient poverty (e.g. Baulch 2011; Hulme et al. 2001; Hulme and Shepherd 2003 
McKay and Lawson 2002; Narayan and Petesch 2007). In countries with data, it has been 
estimated that the percentage of the poor that are always poor comprises typically 20–40 per 
cent of poor households (see data in Dercon and Shapiro 2007).  
 
Given these points, it is important that the distribution of global poverty noted by expenditure 
poverty holds across other poverty measures (see Alkire et al. 2011). Further, that the 
population coverage of the poverty data used is reasonable (see Table A1 below). In fact the 
population coverage is of such a level that countries with missing data comprise a relatively 
small proportion of the population of LICs and MICs, and their absence will not make a 
substantial difference to estimates of the global distribution. For this reason, as per Chandy 
and Gertz (2011), estimates here do not ‘fill’ data gaps like Chen and Ravallion (2008) with 
weighted regional averages. There is some slight bias in the estimates towards MICs, but the 
population coverage of LICs is still respectable.  
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Table A1. Population coverage of US$1.25 and US$2 poverty data by country 
classifications, 2008 (% population covered by category, current country 
classifications) 
 
 2008 
LICs 83.5 
MICs 98.0 
LICs and MICs 96.0 
Fragile states (45 countries of OECD 2011) 97.2 
Least developed countries 85.3 
Source: Processed from PovcalNet (2012). Note: Consumption surveys used for all countries with the following exceptions for 
countries with income surveys: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Rep., Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uruguay, Uzbekistan and Venezuela. OECD (2011) fragile states = Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Côte d'Ivoire, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Kenya, Kiribati Korea, Dem Rep., Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestinian Adm. Areas, Papua New Guinea, São Tomé and Principe, Sierra 
Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Rep. and 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Table A2. Countries with no poverty data 
 
Country Country Classification Population (2008) 
Afghanistan Low income 29,021,099 
Eritrea Low income 4,926,877 
Korea, Dem. Rep. Low income 23,818,753 
Myanmar Low income 49,563,019 
Somalia Low income 8,926,326 
Zimbabwe Low income 12,462,879 
Kiribati Lower middle income 96,558 
Kosovo Lower middle income 1,795,000 
Marshall Islands Lower middle income 59,667 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Lower middle income 110,414 
Mongolia Lower middle income 2,641,216 
Samoa Lower middle income 178,869 
Solomon Islands Lower middle income 510,672 
Tonga Lower middle income 103,566 
Tuvalu Lower middle income n/a 
Uzbekistan Lower middle income 27,313,700 
Vanuatu Lower middle income 233,866 
American Samoa Upper middle income 66,107 
Antigua and Barbuda Upper middle income 86,634 
Argentina Upper middle income 39,882,980 
Cuba Upper middle income 11,204,735 
Dominica Upper middle income 73,193 
Grenada Upper middle income 103,538 
Lebanon Upper middle income 4,193,758 
Libya Upper middle income 6,294,181 
Mauritius Upper middle income 1,268,854 
Mayotte Upper middle income 191,187 
Palau Upper middle income 20,279 
St. Kitts and Nevis Upper middle income 49,190 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Upper middle income 109,117 
Source: Processed from PovcalNet (2012). 
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